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Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old 
Remedy for “Bad” Speech 
Robert D. Richards∗  and Clay Calvert∗∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Louis Brandeis, in his concurring opinion nearly seventy-
five years ago in the criminal syndicalism case of Whitney v. Califor-
nia,1 articulated the premise of what today is known as the doctrine 
of counterspeech.2 When it came to expression that was perceived by 
some to be dangerous, threatening, or harmful, Brandeis famously 
wrote, “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood 
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the rem-
edy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”3 
At the heart of the counterspeech doctrine is the principle, as 
Laurence Tribe writes, that “whenever ‘more speech’ could eliminate 
a feared injury, more speech is the constitutionally-mandated rem-
edy.”4 Rather than censor allegedly harmful speech and thereby risk 
violating the First Amendment5 protection of expression, or file a 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Journalism & Law and Founding Director of the Pennsylvania 
Center for the First Amendment at Pennsylvania State University. B.A. 1983, M.A. 1984, 
Communications, Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1987, American University. Member, 
State Bar of Pennsylvania. 
 ∗∗  Assistant Professor of Communications & Law and Co-Director of the Pennsylvania 
Center for the First Amendment at Pennsylvania State University. B.A. 1987, Communica-
tions, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, Univer-
sity of Pacific; Ph.D. 1996, Communications, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of Cali-
fornia. 
 1. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 2. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, “Free Speech” and Its Discontents: The Rebellion 
Against General Propositions and the Danger of Discretion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 433 
(1996) (observing that Justice Brandeis “insisted that in spite of dangers, the only appropriate 
remedy for much evil speech is counter-speech and reason” (footnote omitted)). 
 3. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 4. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 834 (2d ed. 1988). 
 5. The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free 
Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
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lawsuit that threatens to punish speech perceived as harmful, the pre-
ferred remedy is to add more speech to the metaphorical marketplace 
of ideas.6 In defamation law,7 for instance, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that “the first remedy of any victim of defama-
tion is self-help—using available opportunities to contradict the lie or 
correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on repu-
tation.”8 
The idea that “bad speech” can be effectively countered or cured 
with more speech, however, has recently come under fire in some 
quarters.9 The effectiveness of counterspeech, for instance, may be 
limited by the amount of time available to refute the pernicious 
speech in question and “whether the counter-message comes to the 
attention of all the persons who were swayed by the original idea.”10 
Critical race theorists have argued as well that some minority groups 
experience “diminished access to private remedies such as effective 
 
 6. The marketplace of ideas “is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech 
tradition.” RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992). The market-
place metaphor “consistently dominates the Supreme Court’s discussions of freedom of 
speech.” C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (1989) (footnote 
omitted). The metaphor is used frequently today, more than seventy-five years after it first be-
came a part of First Amendment jurisprudence with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr.’s often-quoted admonition that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court 
Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40 (1996) (providing a 
recent review of the Court’s use of the marketplace metaphor). 
 7. Defamation includes both the libel and slander torts. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984). The basic ele-
ments to state a cause of action for defamation include: “(a) a false and defamatory statement 
concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault . . .; and (d) ei-
ther actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm 
caused by the publication.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). “Libel is writ-
ten or visual defamation; slander is oral or aural defamation.” ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. 
BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 67 (2d ed. 1994) (footnote omitted). 
 8. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
 9. Kathleen Sullivan, current Dean of the Stanford Law School, writes: 
In common with the anti-pornography feminists, hate speech regulators view such 
speech as subordination and think that more speech—that old common cure for bad 
speech—is in these cases an inadequate remedy. This is not an area, they say, where 
we can rely on good counsel to drive out bad. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 974 (1995) (foot-
note omitted). 
 10. Vincent Blasi, Propter Honoris Respectum: Reading Holmes Through the Lens of 
Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1357 (1997). 
CAL-FIN.DOC 5/6/00  2:05 PM 
553] Counterspeech 2000 
 555 
counterspeech.”11 Hate speech also may have what Professor Owen 
Fiss describes as a “silencing effect” on its victims, disabling and dis-
crediting “a would-be speaker” and thereby reducing the effective-
ness of counterspeech.12 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, the outspoken feminist legal scholar, 
suggests that the same problem observed by critical race theorists—
limited access to the means of communication—plagues those who 
would use counterspeech to criticize individuals in power. She writes 
that “silencing” may occur through “the refusal of publishers and 
editors to publish, or publish well, uncompromised expressions of 
dissent that make them uncomfortable by challenging the distribu-
tion of power, including sexual power.”13 It is, in other words, an 
unfair marketplace of ideas in which unequal access to the means of 
communication denies some groups the remedy of counterspeech. 
As legal scholars Robert Jensen and Elvia Arriola write from a critical 
perspective, “those who have power continue to have the greatest 
opportunities to speak in an effective manner.”14 
Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized that in 
some cases counterspeech may not be an effective remedy for harmful 
speech. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,15 for instance, the 
Court suggested, “False statements of fact are particularly valueless” 
because “they cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot 
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.”16 
Counterspeech, in brief, is seen as a constitutionally preferred yet 
somewhat suspect and sketchy remedy for harmful speech. Although 
counterspeech is not always a perfect remedy, individuals and courts 
should seriously consider it as a solution. When used wisely, counter-
speech may prove to be a very effective solution for harmful or 
threatening expression. 
 
 11. MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 48 (1993). 
 12. OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 25 (1996). Even Fiss, however, ac-
knowledges that in individual cases involving hate speech, “[t]he traditional remedy—more 
speech—might be far better” than other remedies. Id. Thus, he does not preclude counter-
speech as a useful avenue of redress. 
 13. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 77 (1993). 
 14. Robert Jensen & Elvia R. Arriola, Feminism and Free Expression: Silence and Voice, 
in FREEING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
195, 197 (David S. Allen & Robert Jensen eds., 1995). 
 15. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 16. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
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This article examines an eclectic collection of recent free-speech 
battles in which various manners and modes of counterspeech have 
been used—some perhaps more effectively than others—as antidotes 
for allegedly harmful speech. The examples of counterspeech de-
scribed here take many forms, stretching from the thoroughly low-
tech use of billboards by concerned citizens in Missouri to counter-
act expression by the Ku Klux Klan17 to the very high-tech employ-
ment of the World Wide Web18 by the maker of a diet pill to launch 
a pre-emptive counter strike against an allegedly critical television 
broadcast.19 In yet another case, the Food Lion supermarket chain 
employed a major public relations firm to disseminate video tapes 
and packets of information to members of the press and legal com-
mentators as part of the non-legal portion of its counterattack 
against an unflattering report by ABC’s now-defunct television news 
magazine, PrimeTime Live.20 Then there is the ongoing battle 
against underage smoking, a fight in which counterspeech in the 
form of televised antismoking public service announcements now has 
taken center stage under the forty-six-state settlement with the to-
bacco industry.21 And finally, in the never-ending fight over contro-
versial artistic expression, counterspeech takes some of its most 
primitive yet perhaps most effective forms—organized protests, 
picket signs, and chanting.22 
While the common thread running through these cases is the use 
of speech to oppose allegedly harmful or negative expression, this ar-
ticle also draws attention to some critical differences in the tactics 
and strategies used to implement the counterspeech. The different 
strategies, in turn, influence the efficacy of the counter expression. 
Ultimately, this article suggests that counterspeech is most effective 
when its proponents are able to call journalistic attention to their 
message, place it on the media’s agenda, and thereby exponentially 
increase the audience to whom the message is disseminated. 
 
 17. See infra notes 25-48 and accompanying text. 
 18. The World Wide Web “is a global hypertext system that runs on the Internet” and 
allows one to navigate “by clicking on hyperlinks (embedded links) that connect to other 
documents or graphic, audio or video resources.” Joseph Kershenbaum, E-Commerce Primer: 
A Concise Guide to the New Public Network, E-COM. L. REP. 14, 14-15 (Sept. 1999). 
 19. See infra notes 101-37 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 49-100 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 138-76 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 177-98 and accompanying text. 
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II. “GARBAGE” SPEECH AND THE KU KLUX KLAN: THE EFFECTIVE 
USE OF PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF DISAFFECTION 
Like many states, Missouri has a voluntary adopt-a-highway pro-
gram to help clean up refuse along its roadways.23 In exchange for 
picking up litter, a group gets its name posted on a sign along its 
adopted stretch of highway.24 By 1999, there were 5000 groups 
across Missouri that participated in the program.25 Hundreds of signs 
recognizing groups and individuals, in turn, are posted today on the 
state’s highways.26 
Two of those signs, however, have caused considerable contro-
versy. In May 1994, the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan filed an appli-
cation to adopt a half-mile stretch of Interstate 55 within the City of 
St. Louis.27 After a bitter and protracted battle in federal court with 
the Missouri State Highway Transportation Commission, a federal 
trial court ruled in April 1999 that the Klan had a right to participate 
in the state-run program.28 The judge concluded, “As lacking as the 
Klansman’s ideology may be of any redeeming social, intellectual or 
spiritual value, the Constitution of the United States protects his 
right to express that ideology as freely as one whose views society 
embraces.”29 
Although the Klan did not get the original piece of highway it 
sought inside the City of St. Louis, it nonetheless ended up with a 
one-mile strip of Interstate 55 in south St. Louis County.30 And in 
late November 1999, the Missouri Department of Transportation 
dutifully erected two brown, adopt-a-highway signs announcing that 
the Ku Klux Klan would pick up trash, plant flowers, and mow the 
land near its portion of roadway.31 
 
 23. See Tim Bryant, KKK is Free to Pick Up Litter, but Not in St. Louis, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 14, 1999, at B1. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Lorraine Kee & Tim Bryant, State Again Tries to Block KKK from Litter Pro-
gram, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 1999, at C1. 
 27. See Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated on ju-
risdictional grounds, 112 F.3d 1332 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 28. See Cuffley v. Mickes, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029-30 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
 29. Id. at 1030. 
 30. See Carolyn Tuft, KKK “Adopt-A-Highway” Signs Go Up Along I-55, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 1999, at A1. 
 31. See id. 
CAL-FIN.DOC 5/6/00  2:05 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
558 
The initial response? One sign was chopped down by vandals less 
than twenty-four hours after it was erected.32 The Missouri Depart-
ment of Transportation quickly put the sign back up at the taxpayer’s 
expense.33 But that same evening after the vandalized sign was fixed, 
both signs were stolen.34 
These swift measures of vigilante justice—private censorship, 
really—extracted against the Klan’s message represent one form of 
response to speech with which we disagree. That response is to stifle 
the speech altogether—to, quite literally, steal the message and 
thereby effectively remove it from the marketplace (at least, from the 
roadside marketplace in the Missouri case) of ideas. In fact, in re-
sponse to the Klan’s highway signs, one Missouri politician even 
called for the end of the entire adopt-a-highway program, apparently 
concluding that stifling offensive speech was more important than 
promoting a clean environment and volunteerism.35 
Is this the proper response to the expression of a group whose 
ideas are offensive to the vast majority of people? No. As Justice Wil-
liam Brennan wrote in holding that flag burning is a form of speech 
protected by the First Amendment, “If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”36 Justice Brennan’s point is just 
as applicable to government action like the Missouri Department of 
Transportation’s attempt to deny the Klan’s application based on its 
discriminatory viewpoints as it is to the private action of the thieves 
who pilfered the signs. Especially in a case like this in which there is 
plenty of time to refute the message, counterspeech should be the 
action of first resort.37 
 
 
 32. See Carolyn Tuft, Highway Workers Re-Erect KKK Sign on Interstate 55 After Van-
dals Saw It Down, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1999, at A1. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Carolyn Tuft & Donald E. Franklin, Ku Klux Klan’s Adopt-A-Highway Signs 
Are Stolen from Interstate 55, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1999, at A1. 
 35. See Carolyn Tuft, Vandals Zero In on KKK Sign; County Lawmaker Asks State to 
End Cleanup Program, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 1999, at A1. 
 36. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 37. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the government 
cannot forbid even the advocacy of force or illegal action “except where such advocacy is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action”). 
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Counterspeech, in this case, proved to be the perfect self-help 
remedy for those offended by the presence of the Klan’s name on lit-
ter-removal highway signs. In December 1999, a coalition of civil 
rights groups decided to place a carefully crafted message of both 
unity and diversity on a billboard near the location of the Klan’s own 
signs.38 The billboard’s message was simple and eloquent: “Freedom 
of speech protects all people even if they are wrong.”39 
This remedy was effective for three reasons. First, the message 
struck at the importance of freedom of speech and the noble (if 
somewhat ironic) principle of tolerating intolerant expression in a 
free society.40 The billboard, which was donated for forty-five days 
by a local media group,41 not only made the point that the First 
Amendment protects minority viewpoints like the Klan’s, but that it 
also protects the majority viewpoint that the Klan’s speech simply is 
“wrong.” To the vandals who swiped the highway signs, the bill-
board suggests that their actions were also wrong and that they must 
come to recognize that freedom of speech protects even the Klan. In 
brief, the message not only addresses the Klan, but also, at least im-
plicitly, the individual or individuals who stole the signs. 
Moreover, counterspeech serves another important function. It 
allows a third audience, namely the residents of St. Louis and St. 
Louis County who believe in freedom of speech and yet object to 
the Klan, to feel good about themselves. The message is a form of 
self-realization and self-fulfillment achieved through speech. The 
counterspeech in this case thus serves not only a substantive purpose 
in counteracting the Klan’s racist ideologies and the vandals’ criminal 
propensities, but also serves as a therapeutic measure of healing for 
the vast majority of people in St. Louis. 
Finally, the counterspeech was particularly effective because the 
message on the 672-square-foot billboard received substantial cover-
age in the local news media. In brief, the message of tolerance was 
 
 38. See Donald E. Franklin, Civil Rights Groups Will Counter KKK with Message of Di-
versity, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 23, 1999, at B5. 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 10 (1986) (arguing that 
“free speech involves a special act of carving out one area of social interaction for extraordinary 
self-restraint, the purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a social capacity to control 
feelings evoked by a host of social encounters”). 
 41. See Lorraine Kee, Civic Groups Will Put Up Billboard Near Site of Klan Signs, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 7, 2000, at B1. 
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received by more than just those drivers who happened to pass by 
the billboard on their way to or from work; it was also conveyed to 
anyone who read the local newspaper, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
The newspaper even went so far as to publish its own editorial laud-
ing the counterspeech measure employed by the coalition of civil 
rights groups.42 Evoking the marketplace of ideas metaphor, the edi-
torial quoted poet John Milton’s famous statement: “Truth be in the 
field . . . Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth to be 
put to the worse in an free and open encounter?”43 Perhaps more 
importantly, the editorial recognized the doctrine of counterspeech, 
expounding that “[t]he best answer for hate speech is more speech, 
not less.”44 
The coverage given by the mainstream media suggests an impor-
tant lesson for those who choose to engage in the self-help remedy 
of counterspeech: create a simple, pithy message that resonates with 
journalists. If the message appeals to journalists, it eventually will 
find its way to their news agenda, and the media then will republish 
it to a larger audience. The Post-Dispatch, in other words, spread the 
counterspeech message for free when it wrote news stories and edito-
rials about the billboard. This is an effective use of free publicity by 
practitioners of counterspeech that should not be lost on others. 
Furthermore, the principle of counterspeech, kick-started by the 
billboard, spread through St. Louis. In late January 2000, another 
clever counterspeech remedy was proposed: naming the same stretch 
of highway on which the Klan’s signs are posted in honor of seam-
stress-turned-civil-rights-activist Rosa Parks.45 Signs signaling the 
Klan’s litter removal project would be countered with signs signaling 
the Rosa Parks freeway. Thus, this situation represents the height of 
counterspeech in a very public place in a very public manner. 
In summary, the battle in Missouri over the Klan’s efforts to 
adopt a highway demonstrates several possible responses to speech 
with which we may disagree or find offensive. One simply is for the 
government to censor the speech; that was Missouri’s initial response 
when it attempted to deny the Klan’s application. A second re-
sponse—vigilante justice in stealing the speech once it reaches the 
 
 42. See Truth Is in the Field, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 26, 1999, at B2. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See A Symphony of Protest, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2000, at B2. 
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marketplace of ideas—amounts to private censorship. The third rem-
edy is counterspeech, and in this case it proved highly effective. 
Thus, it should be the preferred remedy. 
The Klan case suggests the effective use of billboards as a me-
dium for conveying messages to counteract hate speech. This is par-
ticularly important because it helps to refute the attack of critical race 
theorists, as set forth in the Introduction, that counterspeech is an 
ineffective remedy to hate speech.46 The next section explores the 
very different use of public relations counterspeech to refute a very 
different message. 
III. A SUPERMARKET CHAIN’S MARCH: IN LIKE A LION, OUT LIKE 
A LAMB 
There are at least two very distinct, yet not mutually exclusive, 
ways to attack harmful speech. The first is legal: to file a lawsuit and, 
by doing so, to contest that harmful speech behind courtroom doors 
and in the pages of points and authorities. The second is non-legal: 
to employ the self-help remedy of counterspeech and to contest that 
adverse speech more openly, in the court of public opinion. 
In the case described below, a major supermarket chain em-
ployed both tactics in an ill-fated, two-pronged attack against a major 
news organization. Although both the legal and counterspeech of-
fensives arguably failed in this case, a close inspection reveals that 
counterspeech may have been much more productive and effective 
had the aggrieved party simply followed some basic public relations47 
principles. 
A. The Legal Offensive: Was It Worth Two Dollars in Damages? 
In October 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit handed ABC News a resounding and hard fought vic-
tory48 in a case that both challenged journalistic practices49 and 
 
 46. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
 47. Although definitions vary, public relations practice may be defined as “the planned 
and sustained effort to establish and maintain goodwill and mutual understanding between an 
organization and its publics.” FRANK JEFKINS, PUBLIC RELATIONS TECHNIQUES 7 (2d ed. 
1994). 
 48. ABC News President David Westin called the appellate decision “a victory for the 
American tradition of investigative journalism.” Lisa de Moraes, With Appeals Court Ruling, 
ABC Won’t Pay Food Lion’s Share, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1999, at E1. 
 49. See generally JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 164-68 (3d ed. 
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heightened awareness of the power and pitfalls of counterspeech. 
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.50 was the cross-appeal of 
a $5.5 million jury verdict51 (later reduced by the trial judge to 
$315,000)52 against ABC’s PrimeTime Live news magazine for a 
story it ran about allegedly unsanitary food-handling practices at the 
Food Lion supermarket chain.53 ABC’s report contained video foot-
age purporting to show store workers repackaging fish with a new 
expiration date, combining expired ground beef with fresh meat, and 
applying barbecue sauce to dated chicken and selling it as a gourmet 
selection.54 
The truth of ABC’s broadcast was not at issue in the case.55 In-
stead, the focus was the network’s tactics in gathering information.56 
To gain access, producers Lynne Dale and Susan Barnett applied for 
jobs at two Food Lion stores, one in North Carolina and the other 
in South Carolina.57 They lied on their applications and created ficti-
tious references.58 The scheme worked, and the pair was hired in 
spring 1992.59 Once inside the grocery stores, the media moles used 
miniature hidden cameras to record footage that would later become 
the mainstay of the broadcast and create an image crisis of historic 
proportions for Food Lion.60 
After the report first aired on November 5, 1992, Food Lion 
sued ABC and its producers on four counts:61 fraud,62 breach of duty 
 
1999) (analyzing ethical issues raised by the deceptive journalistic practices of ABC employees 
in gathering information about the Food Lion supermarket chain). 
 50. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 51. See Howard Kurtz & Sue Anne Pressley, Jury Finds Against ABC for $5.5 Million, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1997, at A01 (describing the jury verdict). 
 52. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 940 (M.D.N.C. 
1997). 
 53. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 54. See id. at 511. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 510 (explaining that “Food Lion did not sue for defamation, but focused 
on how ABC gathered its information”). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. The two producers recorded “approximately 45 hours of concealed camera foot-
age.” Id. at 511. 
 61. See id. at 510. 
 62. The fraud allegation requires proof that the defendant made a false representation of 
material fact, either knowing it was false or making it with reckless disregard of its truth or fal-
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of loyalty,63 trespass,64 and unfair trade practices.65 The supermarket 
sought damages for the administrative costs associated with hiring 
the two producers, as well as publication damages for lost profits re-
sulting from the broadcast.66 The trial judge ruled, however, that 
publication damages were not appropriate because Food Lion could 
not show that its loss of profits and sales, along with diminished 
stock value, were proximately caused by the PrimeTime Live news-
gathering tactics.67 The jury found for Food Lion on the other 
counts.68 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected both the fraud and unfair 
trade practices claims. It ruled that the misrepresentations by the re-
porters did not justify damages on fraud grounds because the com-
pany could not successfully show that it had reasonably relied on the 
statements made on the job applications.69 While the reporters 
knowingly misrepresented their credentials, they did not represent 
that they would work longer than a week or two.70 In fact, the appli-
cation itself contained a statement that “employment is for an in-
definite period of time” and both the employee and the company 
 
sity, with the intent that the plaintiff rely upon it. See id. at 512. In addition, the plaintiff must 
be injured through reasonable reliance on the false representation. See id. 
 63. A breach of duty of loyalty occurs if an employee: (1) competes directly with her 
employer; (2) misappropriates her employer’s profits, property, or business opportunities; or 
(3) breaches her employer’s confidences. See id. at 515-16. 
 64. Trespass is an entry upon another’s property without consent. See id. at 517. In ad-
dition, an individual who exceeds the scope of consent to enter property commits a trespass. 
See id. at 518. 
 65. This claim was made under North Carolina’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, which 
“prohibits ‘[u]nfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ that are 
‘in or affecting commerce.’” Id. at 519 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a)). 
 66. See id. at 511. Note that Food Lion did not claim defamation—the usual method 
for recovering reputation damages—in its lawsuit. Libel plaintiffs recognize the difficulty in 
overcoming the First Amendment hurdles associated with suing the news media for the con-
tent of their publications. More recently, a litigation tactic has been to sue on the basis of the 
newsgathering process. Cf. DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 129 (2000) (observing that 
“some aggrieved parties who don’t think they can win a libel suit against the press use other 
kinds of lawsuits to try to harass or frighten their critics,” including suits for trespass and inva-
sion of privacy). 
 67. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 966 (M.D.N.C. 
1997). 
 68. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 69. See id. at 513. 
 70. See id. 
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have a right to terminate employment at any time.71 Thus, Food 
Lion’s claim that it needlessly paid administrative costs associated 
with hiring these two “workers,” who never intended to stay beyond 
a few weeks, was unfounded in an at-will employment situation.72 
Similarly, Food Lion was not entitled to recoup the wages it paid to 
Dale and Barnett because they were compensated for the work tasks 
they did. In reversing the fraud verdict, the appellate court noted 
that one supervisor had even said shortly before Dale quit that “she 
would ‘make a good meat wrapper.’”73 
The court of appeals also ruled that the district court erred in as-
sessing liability under North Carolina’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.74 
The Act principally protects the public that may be harmed by unfair 
competition. Clearly, ABC did not intend to harm the public. Quite 
to the contrary, as the court pointed out, “[p]resumably, ABC in-
tended to benefit the consuming public by letting it know about 
Food Lion’s food handling practices.”75 
Despite these rulings against Food Lion on the fraud and unfair 
trade practices claim, all was not yet lost for the supermarket chain. 
The appellate court upheld the jury’s finding that Dale and Barnett 
breached their duty of loyalty to their employer by videotaping for 
PrimeTime Live while employed at Food Lion. As the opinion noted, 
“ABC’s interest was to expose Food Lion to the public as a food 
chain that engaged in unsanitary and deceptive practices. Dale and 
Barnett served ABC’s interest, at the expense of Food Lion . . . .”76 
The appellate court further found that the reporters committed tres-
pass “because the breach of duty of loyalty—triggered by the filming 
in non-public areas, which was adverse to Food Lion—was a wrong-
ful act in excess of Dale and Barnett’s authority to enter Food Lion’s 
premises as employees.”77 
Food Lion’s victories on the trespass and breach of loyalty 
claims, however, would prove virtually meaningless from a financial 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 514. 
 74. See id. at 520 (noting that there is a limited business-to-business use of the Act, but 
that usage applied only when the businesses are competitors or engaged in trade dealings with 
each other, which clearly did not apply in this instance). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 516. 
 77. Id. at 518. 
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perspective because the Fourth Circuit refused to allow recovery of 
the big money sought by the supermarket chain: publication dam-
ages for loss of good will and lost sales caused by the broadcast.78 In 
reaching this result, the court focused on Food Lion’s crafty yet 
transparent avoidance of the tort of defamation. The supermarket 
chain opted to make an “end-run around First Amendment stric-
tures”79 of defamation law such as proof of actual malice.80 The court 
was not fooled by this tactic, noting that “[w]hat Food Lion sought 
to do, then, was to recover defamation-type damages under non-
reputational tort claims, without satisfying the stricter (First 
Amendment) standards of a defamation claim.”81 Accordingly, Food 
Lion was awarded the nominal sum of two dollars. 
At best, the legal challenge to ABC’s report can be described as a 
turbulent and expensive ride for the Food Lion supermarket chain. 
At worst, it can be looked upon as a poor management decision to 
emphasize legal rather than pure counterspeech solutions to an im-
age crisis. While the company certainly could have viewed the jury’s 
original verdict as exoneration, it may have missed the more substan-
tial point—the jury was reacting to a newsgathering practice it found 
abhorrent rather than absolving the supermarket chain of wrongdo-
ing.82 After the appellate court sorted through the legal issues, ulti-
mately allowing the news industry to breathe a collective sigh of  
 
 
 78. See id. at 523-24. 
 79. Id. at 522. 
 80. Actual malice, as defined by the United States Supreme Court, requires proof that 
the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). It requires an 
assessment of the state of mind of the defendant at the time the statement was published. See 
generally ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED 
PROBLEMS §5.5, at 5-58 (3d ed. 1999). 
 81. Food Lion, 194 F. 3d at 522. 
 82. As technology has improved and recording devices have become smaller, easier to 
hide, and more visually vivid, news organizations are more likely to engage in deceptive infor-
mation-gathering tactics. See LOUIS A. DAY, ETHICS IN MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS: CASES 
AND CONTROVERSIES 85-86 (2d ed. 2000) (observing that “in their search for visual intensity 
and ratings, both the tabloid TV shows and the profitable prime-time news magazine 
shows . . . have turned ‘sleuth journalism’ and undercover news-gathering techniques into an 
art form”). Arguably, the improved technology has “increased the news media’s incentive to 
assume fictitious identities for the purpose of securing access to places where their miniature 
cameras can record that which was previously shielded from public view.” C. THOMAS DIENES 
ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 13-8, at 710 (2d ed. 1999). 
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relief,83 Food Lion was left to sift through the remains of its image—
arguably a wreckage it had, in large part, heaped upon itself. 
B. The Counterspeech Offensive: Mounting a Public Relations Attack 
Food Lion did more, however, than simply challenge ABC in 
court. It also embarked upon a concerted public relations campaign. 
For instance, shortly after one of the authors of this article was 
quoted in the online version of the Greensboro News & Record, the 
site of the trial in the federal case, about his views of ABC’s tactics,84 
he received a packet of information called “Food Lion v. ABC: 
Fakes, Lies and Videotape,” sent on behalf of Food Lion. He also re-
ceived a fifteen-minute videotape created by a public relations firm, 
Sitrick & Co., giving the supermarket chain’s views and featuring 
outtakes from the PrimeTime Live broadcast.85 It seemed as if Food 
Lion was trying to win the hearts and minds of legal commentators 
through counterspeech and, in so doing, influence the battle of the 
sound bites in the media. 
Another creative counterspeech approach employed by Food 
Lion was to enlist the assistance of Jean Folkerts, Director of the 
School of Media and Public Affairs at George Washington University 
and Editor of Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly.86 Spe-
cifically, Folkerts prepared a case study on journalism ethics based on 
the ABC/Food Lion controversy.87 The case study was bundled up 
with the above-mentioned videotape and other information and sent 
to mass communication professors to, as the cover letter from Food 
Lion put it, “assist you and your students in engaging these issues.”88 
This tactic represents a unique and interesting method of coun-
terspeech: causing future journalists while still attending school and 
developing journalistic ideals to consider not only Food Lion’s per-
 
 83. Media defense attorney Lee Levine remarked after the appellate court’s decision, 
“This case has been the poster child for whether or not these kinds of claims are viable. The 
result is going to be that these cases are worth two dollars.” de Moraes, supra note 50, at E1. 
 84. See Len Alexander, ABC Case Puts Spotlight on Journalists’ Ethics, NEWS & RECORD 
ONLINE, Jan. 24, 1997 <http://www.newslibrary.krmediastream.com/cgibin/search/gb/ 
.htm> (visited Apr. 5, 2000) (quoting Clay Calvert). 
 85. Both the videotape and information packet are on file with author Clay Calvert. 
 86. See Letter from Chris Ahearn, Director, Communications and Public Affairs, Food 
Lion, to “Dear Mass Communications Professor” (July 15, 1998) (on file with author Clay 
Calvert). 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. 
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spective in the case, but also the long-term ethical implications of 
ABC’s news-gathering tactics. Just as Food Lion launched a counter-
speech offensive targeting legal commentators and hoping they 
might influence public opinion favorably toward the supermarket 
chain, the company did much the same in the classroom with jour-
nalism educators who might influence budding journalistic practitio-
ners. 
Food Lion also attempted to enlist—perhaps the word “use” is 
more fitting—at least one other major cable network as its mouth-
piece in its war of counterspeech. Specifically, it sent outtakes from 
the ABC broadcast to the Fox News Channel.89 The use of those 
outtakes by Fox drew the wrath of ABC. Said ABC News President 
David Westin, “I find it outrageously unfair that a news organization 
would proceed that way. The tape that Food Lion presented is a 
gross distortion of what actually occurred.”90 Ironically, ABC, a net-
work that had its employees lie and use hidden cameras, called Fox 
News Channel’s approach unfair. 
However, Food Lion’s strategy clearly emphasized winning the 
legal battle against ABC and telegraphing that victory to the public. 
In the view of some public relations professionals, this strategy was a 
mistake. As one commentator observed, “Rather than follow the PR 
industry’s conventional wisdom of admitting guilt up front, apolo-
gizing and fixing whatever was perceived to be wrong, Food Lion 
fought back like the tenacious lion on its logo.”91 Public relations 
expert William Schechter also criticized Food Lion’s response in Pub-
lic Relations Quarterly: 
When companies circle their wagons and craft news releases which 
purport to prove their innocence of any allegations, they too easily 
dismiss how they will be judged in the court of public opinion. Yes, 
the public is down on the media, increasingly so, for providing a 
stream of discomfiting news. But while most people believe that 
the media often are unfair, very few suspect that news organizations 
invent stories. Exaggerate, yes. Completely fabricate, no.92 
 
 89. See Bill Carter, Fox’s Use Of Footage Irks ABC, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1997, at B11. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Mark Albright, After Trial, ABC, Food Lion Battle for PR Verdict, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at 1E. 
 92. William Schechter, Food Lion’s “Victory”—But at What Price?, 42 PUB. RELATIONS 
Q. 20, 21 (1997). 
CAL-FIN.DOC 5/6/00  2:05 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
568 
Schechter argues that an aggressive campaign employing the 
time-honored remedy of counterspeech is the more appropriate re-
sponse when a company faces a major crisis. Instead of protesting in-
nocence, the company should counter the journalistic attack with its 
own forward-looking campaign and “express a sincere, paramount 
concern for the safety and well-being of customers.”93 The company 
should assure the public that it will launch its own investigation to 
root out the causes of the problem. 
Other public relations practitioners and scholars similarly favor 
the counterspeech remedy over the legal response, but recognize 
that the tactic often places the company’s communicators at odds 
with its corporate attorneys. Lawyers typically shun the counter-
speech approach, fearing the message will be construed as an admis-
sion of wrongdoing. 
As Kathy R. Fitzpatrick and Maureen Shubow Rubin observed in 
Public Relations Review, “Defense attorneys seldom advise organiza-
tional decision makers to agree with this type of proactive public re-
lations advice.”94 The lawyerly response often is to “say nothing” or 
“say as little as possible and release it as quietly as possible.”95 In 
their study, Fitzpatrick and Rubin found that company executives re-
lied more often on the legal rather than public relations strategy, 
leading them to conclude that “[g]iven the clear public relations and 
legal consequences for organizations that ignore the public implica-
tions of statements made during such times, this dominance is short-
sighted and costly.”96 
Curiously, the public relations industry has caught up with Jus-
tice Brandeis’s prescription from the early part of the last century—
“to avert the evil by the processes of education”97—but the legal 
profession has not. Strategic issues management requires a company 
to actively counter bad press with positive information. “Gone are 
the days when companies could handle public relations emergencies  
 
 
 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Kathy R. Fitzpatrick & Maureen Shubow Rubin, Public Relations vs. Legal Strategies 
in Organizational Crisis Decisions, 21 PUB. REL. REV. 21, 22 (1995). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 31. 
 97. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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by hunkering down in the boardroom and tossing out a ‘no com-
ment’ every few days until the press and public grew bored.”98 
Employing a counterspeech campaign can be a tremendously ef-
ficient and effective way to refocus the public’s attention in a more 
positive direction, but Food Lion’s tactics, emphasizing legal reme-
dies over public safety concerns, turned out to be misguided. Al-
though Food Lion’s approach to ABC may have defied recom-
mended, textbook public relations strategies, diet pill maker 
Metabolife’s full frontal assault and pre-emptive strike against the 
network’s 20/20 news magazine provides a useful example of how to 
use new technology to accomplish the counterspeech remedy. 
IV. LOSING WEIGHT BUT GAINING GROUND: METABOLIFE’S 
“20/20” VISION 
The diet craze in the United States99 has long provided plenty of 
fodder for researchers and journalists, not to mention advertising ex-
ecutives. A seemingly endless barrage of diet plans and pills contrib-
utes to the steady stream of messages heralding the benefits or fore-
casting the dangers associated with the latest weight-loss system. So 
when Metabolife International, Inc. introduced its product into the 
market in the mid-1990s, the skeptics were quickly summoned to 
task.100 
Known as Metabolife 356, the product is an herbal supplement, 
which purports to speed up the body’s metabolism.101 The increased 
metabolic rate, in turn, is supposed to stimulate weight loss and 
 
 98. Executive Update: Public Relations, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 17, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Group File, All. 
 99. Americans’ obsession with dieting caught the attention of Congress in 1992. After a 
two-year inquiry, members learned from witnesses about fraudulent and abusive practices in 
the commercial diet industry. See, e.g., Deception and Fraud in the Diet Industry, Part IV: 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy of the House 
Committee on Small Business, 102d Cong. 52 (1992) (statement of Barry J. Cutler, Director, 
Bureau of Consumer Protection). 
 100. Metabolife filed a defamation action against WCVB-TV, an ABC affiliate in Boston, 
regarding an investigative series about Metabolife that quoted Harvard Professor George 
Blackburn as saying, “‘You can die from taking this product.’” Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wor-
nick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 1999). U.S. District Judge John S. Rhoades Sr. 
dismissed the lawsuit in November 1999. See id. The company vowed to pursue the case. See 
Thomas Kupper, Defamation Suit by Metabolife Rejected, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 18, 
1999, at C1. 
 101. See Jill Burcum, Metabo-right?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 20, 1999, at 1E. 
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combat fatigue.102 Most of the ingredients in the Metabolife 356 pills 
reportedly are harmless,103 but one, a Chinese herb called ma 
huang,104 naturally produces the stimulant ephedrine. This stimulant 
speeds up the heart rate, increasing blood pressure.105 The FDA 
found that for some people, particularly those with cardiovascular 
conditions, ephedrine could increase the risk of heart attack and re-
lated diseases.106 
In October 1999, ABC’s 20/20 was working on a story that 
looked at the diet claims made by Metabolife.107 As part of its report, 
ABC interviewed Metabolife Chairman Michael Ellis. Correspondent 
Arnold Diaz conducted the interview with Ellis, with ABC’s cameras 
rolling alongside Metabolife’s own video equipment for the entire 
seventy minutes.108 Moreover, Ellis requested that the interview be 
videotaped in front of more than 300 Metabolife employees and 
guests, and ABC agreed.109 
Only a portion of the interview eventually aired in the 20/20 
segment, broadcast on October 15, 1999. Metabolife, however, de-
cided to distribute its entire videotape of the unedited interview in 
advance on October 7 on a special World Wide Web site created to 
preemptively counter the ABC report.110 The site also included sup-
porting product-safety data.111 
Why did Ellis beat ABC to the punch and webcast the entire in-
terview? He said he was worried “that the whole story [wouldn’t] be 
out there” with just the ABC report, and that 20/20 might “have 
[had] a different agenda on how they want[ed] this story to go.”112 
 
 102. See id. 
 103. The product “contains 14 substances, including ginseng, ginger root, spirulina al-
gae, bee pollen and something called royal jelly, which the Metabolife company claims is good 
for the skin.” Id. 
 104. This herb, grown throughout Asia, is used in more than two hundred varieties of 
diet aids. See Mary Duffy, Side Effects Raise Flag on Dangers of Ephedra, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 
1999, at F7. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Burcum, supra note 103, at 1E. 
 107. See David Bauder, Metabolife Outflanks “20/20,” CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999 
(Late Sports Final ed.), at 46. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See News Interview, (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.newsinterview.com/>. 
 111. See Peter Johnson, “20/20” Metabolife Report Survives Internet Attack, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 13, 1999, at 3D. 
 112. Bauder, supra note 109, at 46. 
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In a statement released by the company, Ellis said, “Metabolife was 
concerned because ‘20/20’ appeared to be basing its story on the 
comments of a doctor who is a trustee of the Slim-Fast Nutrition In-
stitute, a competitor.”113  
He emphasized, however, that he did not create the website in 
the hopes of stifling ABC’s report; rather, he explained its purpose 
on National Public Radio: 
We’re just putting the video out there. “20/20” can run this story 
any way they [sic] want to run it. We’re not going to stop them 
from the First Amendment; that’s not our intent. But, you know, 
in America, we all have our First Amendment rights, and “20/20” 
has no proprietary information over our videotape. If they felt it 
was proprietary, they probably shouldn’t have done a public inter-
view. Over 300 people were there, and they knew we were video-
taping it.114 
Michael Ellis also offered an altruistic motive as part of his explana-
tion for the website, saying the increased attention would help him 
underscore a point that diet supplements are “another form of medi-
cine.”115 
Ellis’s motives notwithstanding, the tactics employed by his 
company invoke traditional First Amendment doctrine. Indeed, Ellis 
confidently stated that “‘Metabolife welcomes vigorous debate and 
public scrutiny, but it should be open and honest.’”116 He followed 
up by inviting the public to “‘[v]iew the complete, unedited video-
tape footage, review the relevant data and then watch the broadcast 
and judge for yourself.’”117 This remark can, without much of a 
stretch, be seen as a modern restatement of Justice Brandeis’s 1929 
admonition that “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of educa-
tion, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced si-
 
 113. Jon Lafayette, Countering “20/20” on Net; Company Posts Its Interview Online, 
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 11, 1999, at 2. 
 114. All Things Considered: Diet Product Company Challenges How “20/20” Will Edit a 
Report and Airs Its Entire Interview on its Web Site (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 7, 1999) (tran-
script on file with authors). 
 115. Duffy, supra note 106, at F7. 
 116. Metabolife Posts On Web Complete Unedited Footage of 20/20 Interview Before the 
Show Airs, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 6, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Group File, All. 
 117. Id. 
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lence.”118 By getting out ahead of ABC, Metabolife hoped to shape a 
more favorable message. 
To help make Ellis’s points, Metabolife not only posted the in-
terview on its special website but also purchased advertisements pub-
licizing it in several newspapers, including The New York Times119 
and The New York Post.120 The company also ran commercial spots 
on 1,500 radio stations.121 These advertisements, in turn, generated 
extensive news coverage about Metabolife’s high-tech, counter-
speech campaign.122 And that coverage, in turn, prompted concern 
from news managers. Media critic Bill Carter of The New York Times 
reported that “news executives from ABC, as well as from CBS and 
NBC, acknowledged that the move had implications for journalism, 
especially because making interview material public before it is 
broadcast or published makes the information available to competing 
news organizations.”123 
In the end, Metabolife spent some $2 million on its publicity 
campaign.124 It may seem like a high price to pay for counterspeech, 
but CEO Ellis credits the campaign with “holding ‘20/20’s’ feet to 
the fire to some degree,”125 an indication that the televised report 
turned out more balanced than he had expected. Nonetheless, to en-
sure that the 20/20 audience had the chance to see the full story, 
Metabolife also ran a fifteen-second commercial during the 20/20 
broadcast on October 15, 1999. 
Metabolife’s counterspeech did much more. The preemptive 
strike enabled Metabolife to prepare for the worst. Professor of 
Communication Robert L. Heath suggests that handling a crisis in 
an organization should be viewed prospectively as “an issues man-
 
 118. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 119. See N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999, at A19 (containing a full-page advertisement for Me-
tabolife). 
 120. See N.Y. POST, Oct. 6, 1999, at 23 (containing a full-page advertisement for Me-
tabolife). 
 121. See Duffy, supra note 106, at F7. 
 122. See, e.g., Don Aucoin, ABC’s Metabolife Report Airs Tonight, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
15, 1999, at D20; Bill Carter, Anxious Pill Maker Puts ABC Interview of Its Chief on the Web, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999, at A23; Metabolife Founder’s Past is Past, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Oct. 17, 1999 at G-3. 
 123. Carter, supra note 124, at A23. 
 124. See Howard Kurtz, Over-the-Counter Strategy; Preemptive Interview a Coup for Me-
tabolife, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1999, at C01. 
 125. Id. 
CAL-FIN.DOC 5/6/00  2:05 PM 
553] Counterspeech 2000 
 573 
agement function that entails issues monitoring, strategic planning, 
and getting the house in order, to try to avoid events that trigger 
outrage and uncertainty and have the potential of maturing into 
public policy issues.”126 Metabolife recognized the early warning 
signs—an investigation by a major network television news maga-
zine—and launched a strategy to redirect the public’s attention. As 
the trade magazine Electronic Media reported, “The move by Me-
tabolife is a new form of a company countering a news organization 
when it is the focus of an investigative report.”127 
Significantly, Metabolife used counterspeech to combat what 
Fordham Professor Marion K. Pinsdorf refers to as “Mike fright,” a 
reference to long-time 60 Minutes investigative journalist Mike Wal-
lace.128 Wallace has long been known for his unique style of inter-
viewing where he “uses confrontational tactics [by] provoking sub-
jects and attempting to trap the innocent with his friendly manner—
between you and me (and millions of viewers).”129 This tenacious 
style of reporting has become popular among television investigative 
reporters.130 
The real power of programs such as 60 Minutes and 20/20, how-
ever, comes in the editing process, in which hours of interview time 
is pared down to a few precious minutes or even seconds that create 
an angle the journalist wants for the story. Fear of what ABC might 
do with the interview is precisely what motivated Metabolife to make 
available its side of the story through a medium it controlled.131 Me-
tabolife’s countermeasures diffused the editorial power with the 
Internet’s capacity to stream video onto the company’s website by 
presenting a more complete picture. Further, Metabolife followed up 
the 20/20 piece with its own message touting the safety and effec-
tiveness of its product, further emphasizing its point. 
 
 
 
 126. ROBERT L. HEATH, STRATEGIC ISSUES MANAGEMENT: ORGANIZATIONS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY CHALLENGES 289-90 (1997). 
 127. Lafayette, supra note 115, at 2. 
 128. MARION K. PINSDORF, COMMUNICATING WHEN YOUR COMPANY IS UNDER SIEGE 
49 (3d ed. 1999). 
 129. Id. at 52. 
 130. See EDWARD BLISS, JR., NOW THE NEWS: THE STORY OF BROADCAST JOURNALISM 
288 (1991). 
 131. See Jack O’Dwyer, Sitrick Helps Metabolife with ABC, JACK O’DWYER’S NEWSL., 
Oct. 13, 1999, at 5. 
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By using established media to promote its Web report, the pub-
licity for the company mushroomed.132 According to the company’s 
public relations firm, Sitrick & Company,133 millions of people have 
visited the Metabolife website.134 With other news organizations cov-
ering the story of Metabolife’s response,135 the company was proac-
tive rather than reactive—a useful public relations model. By launch-
ing its website and thoroughly publicizing this effort before ABC’s 
report aired, Metabolife took full advantage of the counterspeech 
remedy in the fashion first envisioned by Justice Brandeis almost 
three-quarters of a century ago. Once again, this time-tested ap-
proach provided a creative solution and helped to diffuse what might 
have been a nightmarish period in Metabolife’s company history. 
The next section explores another counterspeech campaign on a 
much grander scale than typically could be launched by a single 
company such as Metabolife. In particular, the current anti-smoking 
advertising campaign, financed by a massive settlement between the 
states and tobacco industry, is designed to counter the effect of to-
bacco-product advertising, and thus reduce the high levels of under-
age smoking in the United States. 
V. UNSELLING CIGARETTES: COMPELLED COUNTERSPEECH 
The number of teenagers who became daily smokers increased a 
remarkable seventy-three percent from 1988 to 1996.136 The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) reported that more 
than 1.2 million Americans under age eighteen started smoking on a 
daily basis in 1996 alone.137 A study released in late 1999 by the 
University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research found that 
34.6 percent of high school seniors it surveyed nationwide said they  
 
 
 
 
 132. See Jerry Walker, Millions Visit Metabolife’s Web Site, JACK O’DWYER’S NEWSL., Oct. 
27, 1999, at 3. 
 133. Sitrick & Co. is the same public relations firm that Food Lion, Inc. used in its cam-
paign against ABC. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. See also, Lafayette, supra note 
115, at 2. 
 134. See Walker, supra note 134, at 3. 
 135. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Youth Smoking Rises 73% in 9 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1998, at A14. 
 137. See id. 
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had smoked one or more cigarettes in the previous month, a rate 
well above that of the early 1990s.138 
In some states, the numbers are astonishing. A 1997 study con-
ducted by the CDC, for instance, found that forty-seven percent of 
students in grades nine through twelve in Kentucky reported smok-
ing in the month before the survey.139 But high rates are not limited 
to tobacco-producing states. A recent study conducted by the 
American Heart Association found that thirty-six percent of children 
between the ages of twelve and seventeen in supposedly health-
conscious Colorado are regular smokers.140 The Massachusetts De-
partment of Education reported in 1999 that the smoking rate 
among high school students in that New England state was thirty 
percent.141 
Studies suggest that the problem starts before high school. The 
results of a national survey released by the CDC in January 2000, for 
instance, reveal that one in eight middle-school students currently is 
experimenting with tobacco.142 The same survey found that almost 
thirty-five percent of high school students use tobacco in some 
form.143 In total, the federal government estimates that nearly three 
thousand American children and adolescents under age eighteen be-
come regular smokers each day.144 
Many have pinned the blame for the high rates of teen smoking 
on speech by tobacco companies and, in particular, on advertise-
ments featuring cartoon camels and costumed cowboys hawking 
 
 138. See David A. Vise & Lorraine Adams, Study Indicates Teen Drug Use May Be Level-
ing Off, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1999, at A02. 
 139. See James Pilcher, Study Says Anti-Smoking Efforts Pay Off But States With Few Con-
trols Show Tobacco Use is on Upswing, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 25, 1999, at 7A. The same study 
found that the state with the lowest teenage smoking rate was Utah, where just 16.4 percent of 
teens reported smoking in the previous month. See id. 
 140. See Cindy Brovsky, Teen Smoking at Record Levels, DENVER POST, Jan. 1, 2000, at 
B-04. 
 141. See Doug Hanchett, Study Shows Smoking Among Mass. Teens Finally Declining, 
BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 24, 1999, at 23. The thirty percent figure represents a decrease from 
the thirty-six percent rate found in 1995. See id. 
 142. See Marc Kaufman, Many Trying Tobacco in Grades 6-8, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 
2000, at A1. The survey was conducted in September and October of 1999, questioning 
15,000 students at 130 locations. See id. 
 143. See id. A new smoking behavior that is growing among youth in the United States is 
the consumption of bidis—small, brown and hand-rolled cigarettes primarily made in India 
and produced in flavors such as cherry and chocolate that appeal to children. See Bidi Use 
Among Urban Youth—Massachusetts, March–April 1999, 282 JAMA 1416 (1999). 
 144. See Mi Young Hwang, Kids Lighting Up, 282 JAMA 1692 (1999). 
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cigarettes.145 The $206 billion settlement reached in November 1998 
between forty-six states and the tobacco industry, in fact, banned the 
use of cartoon characters in cigarette advertisements.146 The Federal 
Trade Commission even attacked the Joe Camel advertising cam-
paign147 used by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. to sell Camel cigarettes 
as an unfair trade practice, given the character’s appeal to children.148 
It dropped those charges in 1999, however, in light of the settle-
ment149 and over a year after R.J. Reynolds voluntarily abandoned 
the controversial campaign.150 The Joe Camel campaign had been 
criticized almost since its inception for its alleged ability to capture 
the attention of teenagers and children.151 
How should the problem of underage smoking be addressed? 
One key component of the massive settlement mentioned above in-
volves counterspeech. In particular, it includes $1.5 billion—about 
$300 million each year for five years—for a major anti-smoking cam-
paign.152 Specifically, the settlement provides that the money be used 
“only for public education and advertising regarding the addictive-
ness, health effects and social costs related to the use of tobacco 
products and shall not be used for any personal attack on, or vilifica-
tion, of any person . . . company or government agency whether in-
dividually or collectively.”153 Counterspeech is now part of a legally 
enforceable remedy against Big Tobacco. 
 
 145. See generally Clay Calvert, Excising Media Images to Solve Societal Ills: Communica-
tion, Media Effects, Social Science and the Regulation of Tobacco Advertising, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 
401 (1998) (examining assumptions about the influence of cigarette advertisements on smok-
ing behavior). 
 146. See Joseph P. Shapiro, Industry Foes Fume Over the Tobacco Deal, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Nov. 30, 1998, at 30 (observing that “[t]obacco companies will be banned from 
using cartoon characters—which attract young smokers—in ads”). 
 147. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 701-03 (describing the evolution 
of the Joe Camel and “smooth character” advertising campaign). 
 148. See Stephen Labaton, The Media Business: Advertising: Out of Work for a Year, R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco’s Cartoon Endorser Now Faces Government Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
1998, at C8. 
 149. See FTC Drops Joe Camel Case In Light of Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1999, at 
B18. 
 150. See David Segal, Joe Camel Fired, WASH. POST, July 11, 1997, at A01 (describing 
Reynolds’s decision to drop the campaign and calling it “the latest conciliatory gesture” from 
the tobacco industry). 
 151. See William Booth, California Sends Joe Camel to an Earlier Retirement, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 10, 1997, at A10. 
 152. See Ira Teinowitz, After the Tobacco Settlement, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1998, at C01. 
 153. Id. 
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This situation creates a classic counterspeech scenario, one in 
which anti-smoking messages do battle against pro-smoking mes-
sages. Pro-cigarette and pro-tobacco-product ads, it must be re-
membered, are not completely leaving the marketplace of ideas under 
the settlement.154 Although the agreement scraps the use of cartoon 
characters to sell cigarettes and bans the use of billboards,155 it does 
not prohibit the use of often-appealing photographs, for example, of 
the Marlboro Man,156 in cigarette advertisements.157 The failed 1997 
agreement, in contrast, would have banished human figures from 
cigarette ads.158 Some of those human figures apparently are very en-
ticing to today’s youth—about two-thirds of the cigarettes that chil-
dren smoke today are Marlboros.159 Advertisements for cigarettes still 
flourish in the pages of many magazines160 and, in fact, cigarette  
 
 
 154. As a spokesperson for Philip Morris stated in 1999, “we will continue to employ a 
number of activities that allow us to build brand equity by focusing on adults who choose to 
smoke.” Greg Johnson, Billboards into the Ashcan, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at C1. It is in-
teresting to note how carefully that statement is parsed—it expresses the sentiment that ciga-
rettes are marketed to adults—not children—and that people “choose to smoke” rather than 
become addicted to tobacco. 
 155. Cigarette billboards officially came down or were painted-over in April 1999, under 
the terms of the mega-settlement. See Saundra Torry, Giving the Medium a New Message, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1999, at A03. Some were replaced with antismoking billboards. See id. 
 156. The Marlboro Man has been described as a “cultural icon” symbolizing “the most 
masculine type of man.” JULIANN SIVULKA, SOAP, SEX, AND CIGARETTES: A CULTURAL 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ADVERTISING 279 (1998). 
 157. See Shapiro, supra note 148, at 30 (observing that “the Marlboro Man and other 
appealing tobacco symbols stay” under the agreement and writing that stores can still post 
cigarette ads). 
 158. Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, States Approve $206 Billion Deal With Big Tobacco, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1998, at A01. 
 159. See Eric Brazil, $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 15, 1998, at A1 
(quoting University of California at San Francisco Professor Stanton Glantz as stating that the 
settlement agreement “does nothing about the Marlboro cowboy, and two-thirds of the ciga-
rettes kids smoke are Marlboros”). 
 160. Although cigarette advertisements continue to proliferate in magazines, a number of 
major newspapers in 1999 voluntarily stopped accepting tobacco-related advertisements. In 
particular, The New York Times announced in late April 1999 that it would ban cigarette adver-
tising in its pages. See Doreen Carvajal, The New York Times Bans Cigarette Ads, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 1999, at C2. Several months later, the Los Angeles Times announced that it was also 
banning cigarette advertisements. See Narda Zacchino, Why the Times Plans to Ban Tobacco 
Ads, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at M5. The Boston Globe joined the growing crowd in No-
vember 1999, proclaiming that it would no longer accept or carry advertisements that promote 
tobacco products and smoking. See Globe Staff, Globe to Stop Carrying Tobacco-Related Ads, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1999, at C3. 
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companies actually now publish their very own magazines, replete 
with cigarette ads.161 
The case for using anti-smoking advertisements as a form of 
counterspeech is particularly important today, not so much because 
it may reduce smoking, but because it brings into focus the plethora 
of problems that threaten the efficacy of any speech that is designed 
to serve as an antidote for allegedly harmful expression. 
Although the states’ attorneys general who negotiated the set-
tlement surely believed that negative smoking messages would be ef-
fective in reducing teenage smoking (as evidenced by their insistence 
that $1.5 billion be set aside for that purpose), it is clear that not just 
any counterspeech will necessarily lead to this result. Anti-smoking 
messages may, in other words, prove to be a decidedly ineffective 
form of counterspeech if not carefully crafted to reach a particular 
target audience. 
In particular, a number of questions arise that will influence the 
efficacy of the counterspeech/anti-smoking media campaign: 
1. Who should the advertisements target? Preteens? Teens? 
Whites? African-Americans? Asians? Latinos? All of the 
above? 
2. What types of appeals will work best? Scare tactics and fear 
appeals regarding adverse health effects? Humor? Bashing the 
tobacco industry? Ads featuring children? Ads featuring 
adults? 
3. How often should the target audience receive the messages 
on television—once a day, twice a day, more, or less? 
4. Where should the messages be placed? On billboards? In 
magazines? On television? In schools? On the Web? Which 
media, in other words, are most appropriate? 
 
 161. See Alex Kuczynski, Big Tobacco’s Newest Billboards Are on the Pages of Its Magazines, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at § 1, 1 (observing that tobacco companies are now “drawing 
the major publishers of consumer magazines into their marketing fold” and noting that “three 
tobacco giants—Brown & Williamson, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco—have re-
cently joined with Time, Inc., Hearst Magazines, Hachette Filipacchi Magazines and EMAP 
Peterson to produce five magazines”); see also Constance L. Hays, With Joe Camel Put Out to 
Pasture, Tobacco Makers Like R.J.R. Try a More Direct Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1999, 
at C5 (describing a so-called “magalog”—a hybrid of a magazine and a catalog—produced by 
R.J. Reynolds, maker of Camel cigarettes). 
CAL-FIN.DOC 5/6/00  2:05 PM 
553] Counterspeech 2000 
 579 
These same questions, if tweaked slightly, are relevant to any 
counterspeech campaign in the mass media, whether it is directed 
against cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption, marijuana usage, or 
gang violence.162 Identifying a target audience, designing a message 
directed toward that target audience, and reaching the audience with 
that message in an effective forum and for a useful number of times 
are crucial for the success of any counterspeech public information 
campaign.163 
Not knowing how to reach the target audience effectively is one 
potential problem with counterspeech. This danger is particularly 
true with anti-smoking messages. As Dr. Ronald M. Davis, editor of 
the Tobacco Control journal remarked in 1998, “I’m not sure we 
really know how to reach kids effectively with health messages…. 
Kids feel they’re invulnerable, and that makes them hard to 
reach.”164 John Pierce, a professor of cancer prevention at the Uni-
versity of California at San Diego, concurs. He observes that the to-
bacco industry “associates its product with an image that kids want. 
How do you counter that image? We don’t really know, because no-
body’s gotten there yet.”165 
The process of countering the image with counterspeech funded 
by the multi-state settlement is directed by an organization called 
The American Legacy Foundation (“Foundation”), located in Wash-
ington, D.C. which did not select the agencies that would produce 
the campaign until September 1999, nearly a year after settlement. 166 
To help design ads that might be effective, the Foundation brought 
two teenagers from each of the fifty states to Washington to brain-
 
 162. See generally PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE TOBACCO EDUCATION 
AND PREVENTION PROGRAMS (Martin L. Frost ed., 1999) (containing a very recent collection 
of original articles by leading experts in the field of tobacco education and prevention that 
cover a range of tactics and strategies for reaching specific target populations, including youth 
and ethnic groups). 
 163. See generally Ronald E. Rice & Charles Atkin, Principles of Successful Public Com-
munication Campaigns, in MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, 365, 
365 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann eds., 1994) (describing “ways in which communication 
campaign developers, implementers, and researchers can improve the likelihood of campaign 
success”). 
 164. Scott Shane, Ads Against Kid Smoking Have Had Little Effect, HOUSTON CHRON., 
Nov. 30, 1998, at A12. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Stuart Elliott, Arnold Communications is Leading What may be the Biggest Cam-
paign Against Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1999, at C8. 
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storm ideas.167 Some of the initial versions of the counterspeech pro-
duced on behalf of the Foundation, however, faced an unexpected 
obstacle, one not even identified above in the laundry list of con-
cerns: network television executives. 
The preliminary versions of the television advertisements created 
by Arnold Communications of Boston that were inspected by net-
work officials in January 2000 did not go over well.168 In fact, the 
networks called for changes in the advertisements, a move that 
prompted the head of the Foundation to remark, “Some networks, 
apparently, are uncomfortable with effective anti-tobacco advertis-
ing.”169 Those networks probably fear economic repercussions for 
running negative advertisements from some of the giant conglomer-
ates that produce not only cigarettes, but a myriad of other products 
that are currently advertised on television. 
In addition to television advertisements, this counterspeech anti-
smoking campaign also makes use of the radio, print, and Internet 
media.170 Will all of this counterspeech be effective as an antidote to 
pro-smoking advertisements? It is hard to tell, although some states 
that have launched their own media blitzes have experienced some 
success. 
Florida, for instance, experienced an eight percent drop in smok-
ing among high school students after its edgy advertising campaign 
attacking the tobacco industry began on television in 1998.171 This 
was one of the largest decreases ever observed in the United 
States.172 In California, which launched an anti-smoking media cam-
paign in early 1990s, teenage smoking initially declined, but has 
since risen.173 
 
 167. See Kevin Murphy, States Pooling Resources, KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 23, 1999, at 
A7. 
 168. See Networks Unhappy With Early Versions of Antismoking Ads, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 
2000, at A4. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Elliott, supra note 168, at C8. 
 171. See A Year After Tobacco Deal, Anti-Smoking Ads Lag, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 
1999, at 16A; Student Smoking Declines Amid a State Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1999, 
at A14 (describing the early results of the Florida anti-tobacco campaign, and describing the 
“cornerstone” of the campaign as “television and radio advertisements in which angry teenag-
ers accuse tobacco companies of lying”). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See Marques G. Harper, A Pack of Proposals Vie for Tobacco Money, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 1999, § 14NJ, at 7. 
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In summary, the settlement between forty-six states and the to-
bacco industry calls attention to the use of counter speech as a legally 
sanctioned and enforceable remedy to counteract corporate-
produced speech that allegedly contributes to harmful behavior. The 
anti-smoking campaign now underway allows future advocates of 
counterspeech a valuable opportunity to observe what works and 
what fails in counterspeech campaigns on a nationwide basis. As for 
now, however, the bottom line is perhaps best summed up by Dr. 
Gina Agostinelli, a researcher with the Prevention Research Center 
in Berkeley, California: “We know very little about the most basic 
question: Is tobacco counter-advertising effective?”174 
VI. TAKING IT TO THE STREETS: COUNTERSPEECH AND THE ART 
OF PROTEST 
Everyone, or so it seems these days, is a critic. This is especially 
true when it comes to expression called art, and even more so when 
the government is subsidizing or funding that art. Consider the fol-
lowing quotation: “It is dispirited, degrading, disgusting, sacrile-
gious, blasphemous, and an insult to the mother of God.”175 The 
source of that review was the sometime politician, sometime journal-
ist, and apparently now part-time art aficionado, Patrick J. Bu-
chanan.176 New York City Mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, was even more 
to the point: “sick stuff.”177 
The object of this scorn was a controversial 1999 exhibit at the 
Brooklyn Museum of Art called “Sensation: Young British Artists 
from the Saatchi Collection.”178 One work, in particular, appeared to 
bear the brunt of the wrath of the conservative critique—Chris 
Ofili’s “Holy Virgin Mary.”179 Michael Kimmelman, art critic for The 
New York Times, described the work this way: 
 
 174. Jeff Stryker, Ideas and Trends: Fear, Itself: The Right Dose of Scare Tactics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, § 4, at 5. 
 175. Kit R. Roane, Buchanan Visits Art Exhibit in Brooklyn and Doesn’t Like It, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at B5. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Paul Lieberman, Court Tells Giuliani to Back Off in Feud Over Art Show, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at A1. 
 178. See id. 
 179. As one protestor told The New York Times in reference to this work, “We hope with 
our prayers we may send this picture back to hell [from] whence it came.” David Barstow, 
‘Sensation’ Closes as It Opened, to Cheers and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at B3. 
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The Virgin, simply drawn, is black, in a flowing blue-gray robe, a 
flowerlike form, flat against a flat gold backdrop. Small cutouts of 
vaginas and buttocks from pornographic magazines are stuck to the 
picture to suggest putti. Another ball of dung is meant to be one of 
the Virgin’s breasts. Like all of Mr. Ofili’s collages, the work is col-
orful and glowing. The first impression it makes, before you deci-
pher the little cutouts, is that it’s cheerful, even sweet.180 
Kimmelman wryly added that had the artist “called his picture 
‘My Friend Mildred,’ no one would be standing in line to see it. 
Visually speaking, there’s not a lot to it.”181 But there certainly was 
“a lot to it” in terms of the reactions that the speech drew. Those re-
sponses encompass both the use of counterspeech as well as other, 
more severe measures that actually attempt to stifle and silence the 
offensive expression rather than rebut it. 
The possible responses to offensive art are many. One is to si-
lence the art, either physically or financially. The “Sensation” exhibit 
was witness to both of these responses. The physical response came 
from a rather unlikely source—a seventy-two-year-old man from 
Manhattan named Dennis Heiner who reportedly prayed daily to the 
Virgin Mary.182 He allegedly breached Brooklyn Museum of Art 
(“Museum”) security and smeared white paint over the artwork.183 
The devout Catholic allegedly faked a heart attack to draw a guard’s 
attention away from the exhibit, and then scampered under a rope to 
the artwork with what a Museum spokesperson described as “an 
amazing burst of speed.”184 
This response—defacing the artwork—should sound familiar. It 
is tantamount to the response of the vandals in Missouri who first 
chopped down and then later stole the highway clean-up signs de-
scribed earlier in the article that bore the Ku Klux Klan name.185 The 
response is to physically remove objectionable speech from the mar-
ketplace of ideas through any means, even criminal tactics. 
 
 
 180. Michael Kimmelman, Critic’s Notebook: A Madonna’s Many Meanings in the Art 
World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1999, at E1. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Roberto Santiago et al., Virgin Mary Canvas Defaced in B’klyn, DAILY NEWS 
(N.Y.), Dec. 17, 1999, at 7. 
 183. See id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text. 
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The other attempt—this one financial, not physical—to silence 
the speech in Brooklyn came from Manhattan and, more specifically, 
from the office of Mayor Giuliani. In particular, Mayor Giuliani at-
tempted to jettison the government subsidy the Museum received 
for operating expenses and maintenance.186 The theory appeared to 
be quite simple: cutting off the purse strings would cut off the 
speech. The Museum, however, filed a motion in federal court to en-
join the action, claiming that it amounted to a government-imposed 
penalty against the valid exercise of First Amendment rights.187 Judge 
Nina Gershon granted the Museum’s request for a preliminary in-
junction, barring the City of New York and its Mayor from “inflict-
ing, or taking any steps to inflict, any punishment, retaliation, dis-
crimination, or sanction of any kind” against the Museum as a result 
of the Sensation exhibit.188 
Although this fiscal attempt to silence offensive speech does not 
involve physical desecration, its impact—had it been successful—is 
the same. Expression is removed from the marketplace of ideas. The 
speech market is sanitized, rendering only the least objectionable 
content. 
Yet clearly both of these responses to silence allegedly offensive 
artwork are erroneous. The United States Supreme Court has offered 
a series of aphorisms suggesting the subjectivity of meaning of any 
piece of expression—artwork or otherwise—that militates in favor of 
its protection. For instance, the Court famously proclaimed in Cohen 
v. California189 that it is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is an-
other’s lyric.”190 As applied to artwork, one clearly may view the 
Holy Virgin Mary as vulgar, just as one may find it beautiful. 
Over fifty years ago, the Court remarked in a dispute involving 
censorship by the Postmaster General that “[w]hat is good literature, 
 
 186. See Brooklyn Institute of Arts v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 187. See id. 
 188. Id. at 205. The City of New York did not go down easily. Even after the controver-
sial exhibit had left the Brooklyn Museum of Art, the City took its case to the Second Circuit 
of Appeals in an effort to terminate the Museum’s lease. See Greg B. Smith, Brooklyn Museum 
Must Go, City Tells Judges, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 12, 2000, at 54. In late March 2000, 
Mayor Giuliani agreed to abandon his attack on the Museum and to restore the monthly pay-
ments the Museum previously received from the City. See Alan Feuer, Giuliani Dropping His 
Bitter Battle with Art Museum, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at A1. 
 189. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 190. Id. at 25. 
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what has educational value, what is refined public information, what 
is good art, varies with individuals as it does from one generation to 
another.”191 The Court added that “[t]here doubtless would be a 
contrariety of views concerning Cervantes’ Don Quixote, Shake-
speare’s Venus and Adonis, or Zola’s Nana. But a requirement that 
literature or art conform to some norm prescribed by an official 
smacks of an ideology foreign to our system.”192 
What is the proper response to art that we find offensive? Is it the 
response of Messrs. Heiner and Giuliani to silence the speech by one 
means or another? No. Another response that took place in Brooklyn 
actually expanded rather than contracted the marketplace of ideas. 
That was counterspeech. 
On the first day of the “Sensation” exhibit, nearly one thousand, 
mostly Catholic, protesters showed up outside of the Museum, 
clutching rosary beads and holding signs denouncing the exhibit.193 
Some might argue that this counterspeech was counterproductive 
because it actually may have increased the number of visitors who 
saw the exhibit. But this conclusion runs contrary to the very pur-
pose of counterspeech: to promote discussion, not to censor it. Con-
troversial art does its job when it provokes thought and debate on 
established values and mores,194 and the counterspeech of the protes-
tors did the same in Brooklyn. It helped to draw attention to the ex-
hibit and expose people to speech—contemporary artwork—they 
might ordinarily have avoided or ignored. 
The controversy in Brooklyn ultimately proves that despite our 
“inclination to bracket art from the political culture,”195 art is politi-
cal speech. And because political speech is often said to lie at the core 
of free speech in a self-governing democracy,196 art, in turn, must re-
 
 191. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc. 327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946) (emphasis added). 
 192. Id. at 157-58. 
 193. See Michael O. Allen, Protestors, Crowds Turn Out for Exhibit Debut and Rosaries 
Rage, Raves, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 3, 1999, News, at 5. 
 194. In rallying in support of the exhibit, Gary Schwartz, executive director of the Na-
tional Campaign for Freedom of Expression observed, “The purpose of art is to challenge. 
Whether it offends some people shouldn’t determine whether other people can see a painting.” 
Id. 
 195. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VANDERBILT L. REV. 73, 76 (1996). 
 196. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989) (observing that speech expressing 
political dissatisfaction is “situated at the core of our First Amendment values”). In an earlier 
case, the Supreme Court observed that “[w]hatever differences may exist about interpretations 
of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that  
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ceive the most protection. The proper response to art that we object 
to is counterspeech, not its suppression through either physical or 
fiscal censorship. 
The fact that legal efforts in New York failed to shut down the 
exhibit by cutting off funding is also important. Government censor-
ship was not the solution; indeed, it was illegal. Judges such as Nina 
Gershon, who wisely ruled against Mayor Giuliani’s efforts, would 
do even better by going a step further to advise—perhaps in dic-
tum—parties who feel aggrieved by supposedly offensive speech to 
take up counterspeech as the proper means of response. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Counterspeech takes many forms in many media today, from or-
chestrated public relations campaigns like that in the Food Lion ex-
ample which included videocassette messages distributed to journal-
ism professors and media gadflies, to the more primitive hand-
painted protest signs outside the Brooklyn Museum of Art. The 
eclectic mix of cases culled for this article illustrates this point and 
(the authors certainly hope) something more. In particular, as we 
grapple with First Amendment issues that affect new communica-
tions technologies, we must not abandon the timeworn principle 
that sometimes the best response to the speech to which we object is 
neither a lawsuit nor its destruction. It is counterspeech. 
The counterspeech principle is neither novel nor untested in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. An unpopular viewpoint quite naturally 
invites counterspeech, and the resultant discussion has the potential 
to contribute to the vitality of society.197 As the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals suggested in a flag-burning case from the 
early 1970s, “speech can also be provocative but it provokes a re-
sponse in kind rather than those which tend to fill the marketplace of 
ideas with the sound of thudding fists.”198 In short, counterspeech 
fills a purgative role, allowing a dissatisfied message recipient to ven-
tilate his or her thoughts rather than engage in destructive conduct. 
Counterspeech also has been recognized as a way to balance the 
equities in public discourse. More than thirty years ago, the United 
 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 
U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
 197. See Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 198. Id. at 987-88. 
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States Supreme Court upheld the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s ability to impose counterspeech obligations on broadcasters.199 
These obligations remain in force today through the personal at-
tack200 and political editorial rules.201 If someone attacks the integrity 
of another over the air, broadcasters must offer the opportunity for 
an on-air response to counter the original remarks. Similarly, if a sta-
tion endorses a political candidate—or opposes one—in an editorial, 
the offer of free reply time is required. Both of these regulations fully 
embrace counterspeech as the appropriate remedy. 
Whether the goal is to restore the image of a beleaguered corpo-
ration, protest a vile painting, enhance the national debate, or simply 
ward off a common street fight, counterspeech provides the tools for 
leveling the field of expression. We undoubtedly still have a lot to 
learn about the effectiveness of counterspeech in remedying some 
evils, as evidenced by the anti-smoking campaign financed under the 
tobacco industry settlement.202 Despite the problems with counter-
speech, it should be the remedy of first resort, not an afterthought 
discarded in the ash can of First Amendment jurisprudence past. 
New media provide new opportunities for counterspeech, and new 
chances to explore its potential. We must not miss them. 
 
 199. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine—a requirement that broadcasters actively seek out 
issues of public importance to their listeners and viewers and then program a balance of oppos-
ing viewpoints. The Federal Communications Commission abolished the fairness doctrine on 
August 4, 1987, citing the chilling effect it had on broadcasters’ speech. See In re Complaint of 
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5047 (1987). For a discussion of the controversial 
history of the fairness doctrine, see Robert D. Richards, Resurrecting the Fairness Doctrine: The 
Quandary of Enforcement Continues, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557 (1989). 
 200. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (2000) (setting forth the personal attack rule requiring 
broadcasters that air an attack upon the “honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities” 
of a person or group to provide an opportunity for an on-air response). 
 201. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (2000) (setting forth the political editorial rule requiring 
broadcasters that endorse or oppose a candidate in an editorial to provide an opportunity to 
the other candidates for that office or the candidate opposed (or their spokespersons) to re-
spond over the air). 
 202. See supra notes 138-76 and accompanying text. 
